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A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-Sex 
Adoption 
 
Robin Fretwell Wilson
*
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2004 Michael and Rich Butler sued Adoption.com, the largest 
Internet adoption site in the United States, after it refused to post their 
profile as prospective parents
1
 for preview by expectant and placing 
parents.
2
 When the Butlers asked the service why it would not post their 
profile, they were told that Adoption.com ―allow[s] only individuals in 
an opposite-sex marriage to post profiles on the website.‖3 Imagine the 
Butlers‘ shock and dismay. Adoption had been open to same-sex couples 
in California for years.
4
 Not surprisingly, they sued, claiming the refusal 
violated ―California‘s Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits 
businesses from discriminating against their customers on a variety of 
grounds.‖5 Adoption.com argued that no laws were violated because the 
company is domiciled in Arizona, a state which ―does not prohibit 
discrimination against people on the basis of marital status or sexual 
orientation.‖6 The trial court that heard motions for summary judgments 
 
* Professor at Washington & Lee University School of Law. Garrett Ledgerwood, Nick Scannavino, 
and Carolyn Hohn provided diligent, painstaking research assistance. 
 1. Henry K. Lee, Gay Couple Barred from Adoption Site Settle Lawsuit, S.F. CHRON., May 
22, 2007, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi (in Quick Search, type in ―Couple 
Barred from Adoption Site‖ then click on ―past year‖ link). 
 2. See Parent Profiles Home Page, http://www.parentprofiles.com. 
 3. Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 4. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (2008) (permitting second parent adoptions by registered 
domestic partners); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8600 (2004) (permitting ―an adult‖ to adopt a minor child); 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8548 (2004) (allowing ―adoption of a child by a stepparent where one birth 
parent retains custody and control of the child‖ but not defining a stepparent as only the spouse of 
the child‘s parent); Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003) (permitting second-parent 
adoption without regard to the marital status of the prospective adoptive parents). See generally 
Butler, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1044–45. 
 5. Lee, supra note 1. See generally Butler, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 
51.5 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation or marital status by any business 
establishment). 
 6. Lee, supra note 1. See generally Butler, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022. The owners of 
Adoption.com asserted that the Butlers‘ application ―was denied solely because they were not 
married, and that plaintiffs were treated no differently than other unmarried couples who sought to 
post their profiles on ParentProfiles.com. They also assert that the Adoption.com partnership cannot 
be liable for discrimination on the basis of marital status in connection with the October 2002 denial 
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in the matter concluded that fact issues existed about whether the policy 
amounted to impermissible sexual orientation or gender discrimination, 
or instead represented then-legal discrimination on the basis of marital 
status.
7
 
The parties subsequently settled the private litigation between them. 
That settlement required in part that Adoption.com and related 
organizations would not post profiles of Californians ―unless the service 
is made equally available to all California residents qualified to adopt.‖8 
Put to the choice to make its services available to all or to none, however, 
Adoption.com chose to exit the California market. Beginning May 21, 
2007, it no longer posts new profiles from California. Adoption.com also 
promised within six months to phase out all profiles from California on 
its website, ParentProfiles.com.
9
 The Butlers said of the settlement, ―We 
hope that they continue doing business in the state, but if . . . they stop 
doing business in the state, it‘s still a victory for Californians. We‘re not 
allowing them to profit on the back of Californians.‖10 
In a microcosm this case tests whether there is a duty to facilitate 
same-sex adoption, or conversely, a right to refrain from participating in 
a perfectly legal adoption. It highlights poignantly what is at stake when 
we require one party to assist another with a deeply personal and morally 
freighted matter like same-sex adoption. Clearly, some states have 
invited lesbians and gays to parent for a very long time—either through 
adoption
11
 or assisted conception.
12
 Same-sex couples have filled an 
 
of plaintiffs‘ application because the Unruh Act did not prohibit marital status discrimination against 
registered domestic partners until January 1, 2005.‖ Id. at 1054 (claiming the policy ―was applied 
evenly and was not personal to plaintiffs‖). 
 7. At the time of the refusal, California‘s Unruh Civil Rights Act did not prohibit 
discrimination based on martial status. It has since been amended to cover sexual orientation 
discrimination. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 51.5 (2006). 
 8. Transcript of Proceedings, Butler v. Adoption Media LLC, No. CO4-0135 PJH (JCS) 
(N.D. Cal. May 15, 2007), at 5. 
 9. Id. at 7. 
 10. Lee, supra note 1. In 2004 the Butlers adopted a baby girl through a California agency. 
 11. An estimated 65,500 adopted children live with lesbian or gay parents, who ―rais[e] four 
percent of all adopted children in the United States.‖ Gary Gates et al., Adoption and Foster Care by 
Gay and Lesbian Parents in the United States, URBAN INST., Mar. 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411437. Many lesbian and gays adopt their partner‘s biological 
children through second-parent adoption. See generally National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 
Second Parent Adoption in the U.S,  http://thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/second_parent_ 
adoption_laws (last visited April 1, 2008) (indicating that twenty-five states and the District of 
Columbia permit second-parent adoption, either through statute, regulation, or court decision, 
including Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and the 
District of Columbia). 
 12. The field of assisted conception is largely unregulated, at least with respect to who may 
conceive; in this, heterosexuals and homosexuals both are tacitly invited to conceive. This absence 
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important hole in the lives of tens of thousands of children, as have many 
lesbians and gays who have adopted individually. These couples have 
dignitary interests in being treated like any other prospective adoptive 
parents, and the state and children awaiting adoption have a stake in their 
ability to adopt as well. On the other hand, this case shows that when an 
organization or individual asks not to be involved, they sometimes are 
put to an all-or-nothing choice. For entities like Adoption.com, the price 
of ―saving [one‘s] conscience‖13 takes the form of a lost opportunity to 
profit in a particular market. For individuals the cost of vindicating one‘s 
conscience frequently comes at the expense of one‘s livelihood. 
Viewed from the perspective of health law, the frequency and 
ferocity of these moral clashes over same-sex relationships are hardly 
surprising. Moral fault lines have erupted over deeply divisive healthcare 
procedures since Roe v. Wade.
14
 The lesson from healthcare over the last 
half century has been one of temperance.
15
 Nearly every state has carved 
out a space for individuals of conscience to continue in their roles 
without participating in acts that they find immoral. They do this with 
conscience clauses, usually enshrined in state legislation. Much of the 
insulation afforded to healthcare providers under state law, however, 
began with (and continues today through) federal legislation. On the 
heels of Roe, Congress prohibited courts from using the receipt of certain 
federal monies to force private entities to provide controversial services. 
Using its spending powers, Congress later directed state and local 
governments not to punish individuals and organizations for acting on 
their consciences by revoking their licenses or denying them other 
important state benefits. While conscience protections obviously respond 
to concerns that denominational providers and religious observers may 
have, they extend beyond religious objections to encompass moral and 
professional objections as well.
16
 
 
of regulation mirrors the state‘s approach to those who ―reproduce naturally,‖ on whom ―there are 
few restrictions.‖ Susan Apel, Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 2007 EXPRESSO, at 6, 
available at http://works.bepress.com/susan_apel/ (click on the title) (observing that “couples and 
individuals are free to conceive under what many may deem deplorable circumstances: without 
marriage, without a partner, with the assumption of many medical risks to themselves and the future 
child, and even without resources, financial or other, to ensure effective childbirth and 
childrearing‖). In this vacuum of regulation, providers decide individually whether to serve lesbian 
and gay adults. In one survey, 74% of fertility clinics served lesbian couples. Id. (citing Judy E. 
Stern et al., Access to Services at Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics: A Survey of Policies 
and Practices, 184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 591 (2001)). 
 13. James Mills, I Fight On, Says Christian JP Who Quit over Gay Adoption, DAILY MAIL 
(UNITED KINGDOM), Oct. 22, 2007, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles 
/news/news.html?in_article_id=489125&in_page_id=1770. 
 14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 
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This essay seeks to mine the healthcare experience after Roe v. Wade 
for the lessons it can offer in finding a live-and-let-live solution to moral 
clashes over same-sex adoption. It seeks to acknowledge the dilemmas 
facing both organizations and individuals who, as a matter of conviction, 
feel that they can neither support nor participate in same-sex adoptions.
17
 
It argues that conscience clauses offer one way to navigate the recurrent 
but predictable collisions over same-sex adoption. This essay, however, 
is not about who should be permitted to adopt—nowhere does it address 
the merits of including lesbians and gays among potential adopters since 
this topic is amply explored elsewhere.
18
 Instead, this essay asks whether 
adoption agencies and other professionals should be able to decide whom 
they will serve. 
Section II describes recent moral clashes dealing with same-sex 
adoption and shows that clashes occur not only between couples and 
recalcitrant providers but between providers and the State, as well as 
between providers and recalcitrant employees.  Section III then charts the 
myriad ways in which states, after Roe v. Wade, have accommodated 
healthcare providers who are morally opposed to performing abortions 
and other procedures.  Finally, Section IV distills from this rich 
experience with divisive healthcare procedures a number of guideposts 
for navigating moral clashes over same-sex adoption. 
 
 
 
 
B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007) (noting that religious groups have long enjoyed protection from anti-
discrimination statutes, although the level of protection varies with the nature of the discrimination. 
Discrimination involving sexual orientation by religious groups is implicitly exempt, while such 
groups enjoy fewer exemptions regarding gender discrimination and no exemptions regarding racial 
discrimination.). 
 17. For a more complete examination of the moral clashes hastened by same-sex marriage, 
see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the 
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Anthony Picarello, Douglas 
Laycock, and Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., 2008). 
 18. Compare Cynthia R. Mabry, Opening Another Exit From Child Welfare for Special 
Needs Children—Why Some Gay Men and Lesbians Should Have the Privilege to Adopt Children in 
Florida, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 269 (2006) (discussing ―[a]n array of evidence from the social 
sciences and from states permitting gay and lesbian adoption [that] demonstrate that many 
homosexual individuals and couples are capable of providing a healthy, loving, and supportive 
environment for adopted children‖) and Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: 
Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (disputing 
whether research supports a finding of harm to children reared by homosexual parents) with Lynn D. 
Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 894 
(arguing on the basis of research findings for a rebuttable presumption that homosexual parenting is 
not in a child‘s best interests) and Richard G. Wilkins, Trent Christensen, & Eric Selden, Adult 
Sexual Desire and the Best Interests of the Child, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 543, 546–47 (2005) 
(arguing that previous studies suggesting there are ―no differences‖ in outcomes for children raised 
in same-sex households are flawed and unreliable). 
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II.  SCOPE OF CLASHES OVER SAME-SEX ADOPTION 
 
A number of clashes have erupted over same-sex adoption in the last 
two years in the United States and abroad. Like the Butlers‘ suit, some of 
these clashes have taken the form of horizontal struggles—suits between 
prospective adoptive couples to force an individual or organization to 
assist them in the adoption process. A far greater share represents vertical 
claims between the State and a licensee or employee who asks to be 
exempted from assisting with same-sex adoptions or child placements. 
A poignant example of a vertical claim occurred in 2007 when 
Catholic Charities of Massachusetts walked away from the adoption 
business entirely after 103 years of placing children with families in 
Boston.
19
 The organization, as a matter of policy, ceased to place 
children with lesbian and gay couples
20
 in violation of state legislation 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
21
 Catholic 
 
 19. Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 
2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/03/11/catholic_charities_stuns_ 
state_ends_adoptions/ (―Catholic Charities of Boston began in 1903 as an adoption agency.‖). 
 20. Patricia Wen & Frank Phillips, Bishops to Oppose Adoption by Gays, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Feb. 16, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2006 
/02/16/bishops_to_oppose_adoption_by_gays/. Catholic Charities originally allowed a handful of 
gay and lesbian parents to adopt, although it is unclear whether the adopting parent was actively in a 
same-sex relationship. Compare Wen, supra note 19 (finding that ―approximately 13 children had 
been placed by Catholic Charities in gay households‖) with Jerry Filteau, Catholic Charities in 
Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Services, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 13, 2006, available 
at http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0601456.htm (indicating that Catholic Charities 
―had arranged the adoption of 13 children by same-sex couples over the past 20 years‖). After 
reports surfaced publicly regarding the organization‘s placement of thirteen children with gay or 
lesbian parents, the state‘s bishops directed Catholic agencies not to place children with gay or 
lesbian parents. Wen, supra note 19. Catholic Charities‘ board previously had voted unanimously to 
continue the placement of children with lesbian and gay parents. Id. The bishops overruled the 
board, prompting eight members of 42-member Catholic Charities‘ board to resign.  Patricia Wen, In 
break from Romney, Healey Raps Gay Adoption Exclusion, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 2006, at B4. 
Originally, the bishops issued a public statement that they would seek ―relief from the regulatory 
requirements of the Commonwealth [of Massachusetts] on this issue.‖ Statement of the 
Massachusetts Catholic Conference on Behalf of Archbishop Sean P. O‘Malley (Boston), Bishop 
George W. Coleman (Fall River), Bishop Timothy A. McDonnell (Springfield), and Bishop Robert 
J. McManus (Worchester), http://www.thebostonpilot.com/articlearchives.asp?ID=2946.  When 
relief was not forthcoming, however, instead of engaging in a legal battle, Catholic Charities 
discontinued its adoption services altogether. See Minow, supra note 16. 
 21. 102 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.03(1) (2007). Pursuant to the Code of Massachusetts 
Regulations, adoption agencies must obtain a state license and comply with section 1.03(1), which 
provides that ―[t]he licensee shall not discriminate in providing services to children and their 
families on the basis of race, religion, cultural heritage, political beliefs, national origin, marital 
status, sexual orientation or disability. A statement that the program does not discriminate on these 
bases shall be made part of the written statement of purpose where required.‖ Id. (emphasis added). 
This requirement ―dates back to at least 1989, when Massachusetts amended its antidiscrimination 
statute dealing with employment, housing, and government services to include sexual orientation as 
one of the forbidden grounds of discrimination.‖ Minow, supra note 16, at n.301. 
  It is not surprising that an organization would change policies mid-stream or that an 
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Charities approached counsel to seek an exemption from the statute, only 
to be informed the next day by then Governor of Massachusetts, Mitt 
Romney, that any exemption would have to come from the legislature or 
through a judicial ruling.
22
 Rather than bending to the State‘s will, 
Catholic Charities simply folded up shop and, in the summer of 2006, 
stopped placing children for adoption in Massachusetts.
23
 This struggle 
over whether adoption agencies must serve all who ask or get out of the 
adoption business is eerily reminiscent of the choice facing agencies in 
the UK, which have been told to serve same-sex couples or lose all 
public funding.
24
 
Vertical claims are not limited just to facilities; they encompass 
individuals as well. For individuals, who presumably will encounter a far 
greater share of these clashes, the cost of honoring one‘s convictions 
frequently comes at the expense of one‘s job. In 2002 Norah Ellis and 
Dawn Jackson, ―highly regarded‖ social workers with the Sefton Council 
Social Services Department in England, were threatened with dismissal if 
they did not relent in their opposition to working with same-sex 
couples.
25
 Their hesitance, based on their ―Christian faith,‖ surfaced in 
informal conversations over coffee with one of their superiors.
26
  ―The 
pair, who [had] more than 50 years of experience between them were 
told that they faced dismissal as their attitudes contravened the council‘s 
objective of ‗promoting social inclusion, equality of access and 
opportunity.‘‖27 A protracted  battle followed, Ellis and Jackson 
threatened litigation, and the Council backed down. Despite the 
Council‘s retreat, the two ultimately sought employment elsewhere.28 
 
organization‘s leadership would veto an existing practice when it comes to their attention. With 
individuals abrupt reversals may signal the strength of the conscientious objection. With 
organizations it is harder to know what to make of policy reversals. Once the decision not to place 
children with same-sex couples was made, however, the question of an exemption arose. 
 22. Patricia Wen, Bishops Dealt Setback in Pursuit of Gay Adoption Exemption, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2006, at B3, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/ (in Local Search, type 
in Bishops Dealt Setback). But see Patricia Wen & Frank Phillips, Romney Shifts on Adoption by 
Gays, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2006, at B1, available at http://boston.com/news/local (in ―Local 
Search‖ type in ―Romney Shift on Adoption‖) (noting that the governor ―signaled new openness‖ to 
consider the bishops‘ request). 
 23. Wen, supra note 19. 
 24. Patrick Wintour, Will Woodward & Stephen Bates, Catholic Agencies Given Deadline to 
Comply on Same-Sex Adoptions, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/jan/30/children.religion. 
 25. David Harrison, Christian Care Workers Forced out for Opposing Gay Adoptions, 
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 5, 2003, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/ 
2003/05/11/nadopt11.xml&sSheet=/news/2003/05/11/ixhome.html. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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In Great Britain resignations and threats of forced expulsion occur 
regularly. Great Britain has adopted several acts in the last few years that 
together make it possible for same-sex couples to enter civil partnerships 
and to adopt.
29
 In October of 2007, Vincent and Pauline Matherick, two 
―devoted foster parents with an unblemished record of caring for almost 
30 vulnerable children,‖ resigned after being asked ―to sign a contract 
that would require them to discuss same-sex relationships with children 
as young as 11, and tell them that gay partnerships were just as 
acceptable as heterosexual marriages.‖30 The Matherick‘s balked, saying 
they have ―never discriminated against anybody but [they] cannot preach 
the benefits of homosexuality when [they believe] it is against the word 
of God.‖31 The eleven-year-old boy who has lived with the Mathericks 
for two years will be placed with new foster parents.
32
 
And the list of resignations and expulsions goes on. Andrew 
McClintock, a Justice of the Peace in the UK for fifteen years, resigned 
after he asked to sit out of adoption cases ―involving homosexual 
applicants.‖33 The Department of Constitutional Affairs denied his 
request.
34
 McClintock believes ―he was forced to step down‖ because 
presiding over such adoptions would ―require him to set aside his deeply 
held belief that children should only be brought up by heterosexual 
parents.‖35 These resignations sent shockwaves through other 
professional communities. Trying to get in front of the mandate to 
comply or lose one‘s job, physicians in Great Britain are now 
campaigning for a religious exemption for those who are uncomfortable 
serving as references for same-sex couples.
36
 
 
 29. Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33 (Eng.); Adoption and Children Act, 2002, c. 38 (Eng.); 
Equality Act, 2006, c. 3 (Eng.). 
 30. James Mill, Foster Child To Be Taken Away Because Christian Couple Refuse to Teach 
Him about Homosexuality, DAILY MAIL, Oct. 23, 2007, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=489285&in_page_id=1770. (noting they ―could 
also be required to take teenagers to gay association meetings.‖). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. In Derby, England, the Derby City Council rejected as ―unsuitable‖ a couple who had 
previously fostered over 15 children.  The couple, Euince and Owen Jones, charge that the Council 
rejected their application  ―because of their Christian beliefs.‖  When asked ―about what we would 
do if the children asked about homosexuality,‖ Mrs. Jones indicated  that ―she and her husband 
believed homosexuality was wrong. ‗I would not lie, but, on the other hand, I did not feel it was at 
all appropriate for children under ten. However, I am a Bible-believing Christian, and would want to 
tell them what the Bible says.‘‖ Id. 
 33. Mills, supra note 13. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Sarah Womack, GP Seeks Opt-Out in Gay Adoption Cases, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, June 2, 
2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk (in ―Search‖ function type ―GP seeks opt-out‖ and 
then click on article); Sarah Womack, UK Doctors Seek Opt-Out in Gay Adoption Cases, LONDON 
TELEGRAPH, July 2, 2007. 
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Tensions over same-sex adoption parallel the clashes arising in an 
almost limitless number of contexts after the legal recognition of same-
sex relationships. In New Jersey, a same-sex couple filed a civil rights 
complaint against the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, a 
Methodist ministry, for denying their request to hold a civil union 
ceremony in the group‘s boardwalk pavilion.37 The New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection later denied a tax-exemption to 
the group under New Jersey‘s Green Acres program.38 In Manitoba, 
Canada, twelve officials empowered to perform marriage ceremonies 
―quit because they refused to perform same-sex marriages as required by 
[provincial law.]‖39 In February of 2007, a seventy-year-old marriage 
commissioner in Saskatchewan who refused to marry a homosexual 
couple, citing his religious beliefs, was investigated by the Saskatchewan 
Human Rights tribunal.
40
 In California an unmarried lesbian woman sued 
 
 37. See Jill P. Capuzzo, Church Group Complains of Pressure Over Civil Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, at B4. In response to the couple‘s civil rights complaint, Ocean Grove filed 
suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment of their rights under the First Amendment.  Id. 
 38. John Jalsevac, U.S. Christian Camp Loses Tax-Exempt Status over Same-Sex Civil-Union 
Ceremony, LIFESITE NEWS, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2007/sep/ 
07091902.html (reporting that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection stripped the 
Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of its ―tax-exempt status for part of its property‖). The tax-
exemption arose under New Jersey‘s ―Green Acres‖ program, which is ―designed to encourage the 
use of privately owned lands for public recreation and conservation.‖ Capuzzo, supra note 37 
(emphasis added). In this sense, the state conditioned the property tax exemption on public access. 
In contrast, at least one commentator argues that all tax-exemptions received by an organization 
should be revoked or denied if that organization will not serve same-sex couples (even tax-
exemptions that flow from an organization‘s charitable status). See Jonah M. Knobler, Letter to the 
Editor, Mass. Should Revoke Church’s Tax-Exempt Status, HARVARD CRIMSON, Mar. 17, 2006 
(discussing the revocation of tax-exemption for private adoption agencies who refuse to serve same-
sex couples). One homosexual advocacy group believes the Ocean Grove decision ―doesn‘t go far 
enough‖ and may press for ―a bigger victory . . . by having the entire tax-exemption removed.‖ 
Jalsevac, supra note 38. 
 39. Bill Graveland, Alberta Allowing Same-Sex Marriage but Adding Protection to 
Opponents, CANADIAN PRESS, July 12, 2005, available at http://www.recorder.ca/cp/National/ 
050712/n071251A.html. 
  In addition to voluntary resignations, terminations have also occurred. In the Netherlands, 
a registrar was dismissed after refusing for religious reasons to solemnize the wedding of a same-sex 
couple, but was later reinstated by the Commissie Gelijke Behandeling, which enforces that 
country‘s General Equal Treatment Act. EU Network Opinion No. 4-2005. As the Commissie 
explained, insufficient reasons supported the refusal to renew the registrar‘s contract since ―other 
public servants were prepared to celebrate same-sex marriages.‖ Id. 
 40. Memory McLeod, Knights of Columbus Aid Commissioners Who Won’t Perform Gay 
Weddings: Service Club Pledges Support, THE LEADER-POST, Apr. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.canada.com/reginaleaderpost/news/sports/story.html?id=ab7789c1-5988-421d-bd3b-
1ade424e87b1. Although the commissioner is not a government employee and receives no pay from 
the government, the complainant asked the tribunal to order him to pay her client $5000 in 
compensation; the tribunal has yet to issue its decision. Id. 
  Similar questions arise in states that recognize civil unions. See infra (discussing a New 
Jersey Attorney General opinion that requires a public official who elects to be available generally 
for the purpose of solemnizing marriages, to also be available generally to solemnize civil unions). 
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doctors who refused to artificially inseminate her.
41
 
This litigation around same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption will 
crop up with even greater frequency unless and until society openly 
confronts the competing interests it raises. As the next Section explains, 
moral clashes over abortion also took on great urgency after Roe v. Wade 
and were resolved in a variety of ways. 
 
III.  RESOLVING MORAL CLASHES AFTER ROE 
 
While Roe and Griswold v. Connecticut
42
 established very strong 
rights for women and couples to have access to abortion and 
contraceptives, their effect is limited because they established only the 
right of non-interference by the state in these decisions.
43
 Neither 
decision forced anyone to perform an abortion or provide contraceptives. 
Despite that crucial limitation, abortion and family planning advocates 
worked strenuously over several decades to extend these limited, non-
interference rights into positive entitlements to the assistance of others in 
effecting one‘s private choice. 
This attempt to force providers into the abortion business took two 
distinct forms: (1) attempts to force facilities to provide those services; 
and (2) claims brought against individual providers to force them to 
facilitate or participate in abortions, as well as sterilizations or other 
procedures. 
 
A.  Protecting Facilities and Individuals from Suits by Patients 
 
Consider first the efforts to force facilities to offer abortions. Here, 
the receipt of public benefits or federal funds was the bludgeon of choice 
for converting abortion from a negative right into a positive entitlement 
to the assistance of others. In Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, decided 
 
 41. Refusal to Artificially Inseminate “Unmarried” Lesbian, 47 NURSING LAW‘S REGAN 
REP. 7 (2005). In this high-profile case heard by the California Supreme Court, specialists at North 
Coast Women‘s Health Center balked at artificially inseminating an existing patient of the practice, a 
lesbian woman, allegedly because of her sexual orientation. N. Coast Women‘s Care Med. Group, 
Inc. v. Super. Ct. of San Diego County, 137 Cal. App. 4th 781 (2006). Benitez‘s doctors defended 
their refusal on religious grounds, claiming free exercise of religion as an affirmative defense. 
Benitez brought a motion to dismiss the defense, which the trial court granted. The appeals court 
reversed, concluding that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the physicians‘ religiously 
motivated refusal was based solely on Benitez‘s marital status—a permissible grounds for refusal at 
the time—or whether it was based on her sexual orientation, in whole or in part. Id. 
 42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 43. Maureen K Bailey, Contraceptive Insurance Mandates and Catholic Charities v. Super. 
Ct. of Sacramento: Towards a New Understanding of Women’s Health, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 367, 
370–71 (2005) (stating that the rights established in Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut are 
negative rights). 
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shortly before the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Roe, a United States 
District Court in Montana enjoined a private, nonprofit, charitable 
hospital in Billings, Montana from refusing to perform a tubal ligation on 
a patient after the birth of her child by Caesarian section.
44
 In Taylor v. 
St. Vincent’s Hospital, the hospital prohibited Mrs. Taylor‘s physician 
from surgically sterilizing her during the delivery of her baby.
45
 Mrs. 
Taylor brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which prohibits entities 
acting under color of state law from subjecting ―any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws.‖46 In denying the hospital‘s motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, ―the court stated that ‗the fact that the [hospital received 
federal construction fund monies] is alone sufficient to support an 
assumption of jurisdiction . . . .‘‖47 The hospital‘s tax immunity and state 
license also established, in the court‘s view, a connection between the 
hospital and the state sufficient to support jurisdiction.
48
 
This receipt-of-public-benefits argument had considerable success 
until Congress stepped in with the primogenitor of healthcare conscience 
clauses, the Church Amendment.
49
 The Church Amendment prohibits a 
 
 44. 369 F. Supp. 948, 950 (D. Mont. 1973) (noting the court‘s injunction, which was ordered 
Oct. 27, 1972). 
 45. Id. at 949. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 47. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-227 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1464, 1473 
(discussing the preliminary injunction granted by the District Court of Montana in Taylor). The 
hospital received Hill-Burton funds, which were made available to hospitals to modernize and 
construct medical facilities. Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
443, 78 Stat. 447 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2000)). 
 48. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-227, at 1473 (describing the district court‘s finding of ―two other 
factors . . . that established a connection between the hospital and the State sufficient to support 
jurisdiction‖). 
 49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (West 2003). The Church Amendment appears in Section 401 of 
the Health Programs Extension Act, which President Nixon signed into law in June of 1973. Pub. L. 
No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 91, 95. The Church Amendment provided that: 
 
(b) The receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under the [act that created 
the Hill-Burton funds and other acts] by any individual or entity does not authorize any 
court or any public official or public authority to require— 
(1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of any sterilization procedure 
or abortion if [it] would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions; or 
(2) Such entity to— 
(A) make its facilities available for the performance of any sterilization procedure or 
abortion if [it] is prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral 
convictions, or 
(B) provide any personnel for [such services] if [their performance] would be contrary to 
the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such personnel. 
 
  Legislative accommodations outside healthcare date back to 1950s and ―program[s] of 
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court from using receipt of certain federal monies as the basis for making 
an individual or institution perform an abortion or sterilization contrary 
to their ―religious beliefs or moral convictions.‖50 In effect, the Church 
Amendment does not allow federal monies to be used to bootstrap a 
private, not-for-profit hospital into a state actor for purposes of dictating 
the kinds of services that they must provide. 
Like many of the conscience clauses that have followed, the Church 
Amendment protects both individual providers and facilities from 
compelled participation. Importantly, it provides protection not only in 
the ―horizontal relationship‖ between the patient and individual facility 
or provider, but also in the ―vertical relationships‖ between individual 
providers and their employers or facilities. Thus, the Church Amendment 
provides that individuals cannot be punished by facilities—either for 
performing a lawful abortion outside the facility or refusing to perform 
one inside the facility—if abortion is against that individual‘s religious 
beliefs or moral convictions.
 51
 
Despite the Church Amendment, litigation premised on receipt of 
public benefits continued for several years. The Church Amendment, 
however, figured prominently in the push back of that litigation. For 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Chrisman v. Sister of St. Joseph of Peace—confronting nearly the same 
facts as in Taylor—said that the Church Amendment ―was clearly 
intended by Congress to prevent such suits as the one advanced‖ by the 
patient.
52
 The Court summarily dismissed the suit for lack of 
jurisdiction.
53
 
 
 
 
‗released time‘ religious instruction operated by the New York public schools,‖ which the United 
States Supreme Court upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert 
W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: the Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. 
VA. L. REV. 89, 101–02 (2007). 
 50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (West 2003). 
 51. The Church Amendment provided that: 
  
(c) No entity which receives [certain grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantees] may— 
(1) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of employment of any 
physician of other health care personnel, or 
(2) discriminate in the extension of . . . privileges to [them], because he performed . . . a 
lawful sterilization procedure or abortion, [or] refused to perform [one due to] his 
religious beliefs or moral convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral 
convictions respecting sterilization procedures or abortions.  
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (West 2003). 
 52. Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 309–10 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 53. Id. at 310. 
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B.  Protecting Providers from Coercion by the Government 
 
Just as the receipt of public benefits may be used as a wedge by 
private parties to force participation, it can similarly be used by 
governments to coerce hospitals and individuals to provide certain 
services. This, too, happened after Roe. The kinds of benefits that 
governments threatened to take off the table because of collisions over 
abortion included not only state-level tax-exemptions and property tax-
exemptions, but also licensure, certification, and the ability to open a 
facility or emergency room to the public.
54
 Congress responded to this 
threat at the hands of the government with a number of successive pieces 
of legislation designed to protect individuals from government coercion. 
For example, in 1996 Danforth Amendment, Congress prohibited 
federal, state, and local governments from discriminating against 
healthcare entities that refuse to: (1) undergo abortion training, (2) 
provide such training, (3) perform abortions, or (4) provide referrals for 
training or abortions.
55
 None of these could be denied federal financial 
assistance, or more importantly, licensure or certification that they would 
have received from the state had they otherwise agreed to perform these 
controversial services.
56
 This protection was not limited to refusals for 
religious or moral reasons; it extended to refusals for any reason. 
Congress put teeth into the insulation from government coercion in 
2004 with the Weldon Amendment. Tucked into appropriations bills 
beginning in 2004,
57
 the Weldon Amendment is tied to significant sums 
of money. Indeed, it is the proverbial six-hundred-pound gorilla. 
California alone stands to lose $49 billion in federal funds if it 
impermissibly discriminates.
58
 
 
 54. Wilson, supra note 17. 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a)(1) (2000). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2000). 
 57. Dep‘ts of Labor, Health & Hum. Servs., and Educ., and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 507, 118 Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-149, § 507, 
119 Stat. 2833, 2879 (2005). 
  Over time Congress has expanded the scope of covered services in its conscience clauses, 
allowing providers to opt out of not only abortion and sterilization services but also out of providing 
counseling and referral for such services. For instance, in 1988, the Danforth Amendment of the 
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 extended conscience protections to include ―abortion-related 
services.‖ Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 909, 28 Stat. 28, 29 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 1688) (providing that 
the receipt of monies under Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination in federally-funded 
education programs, may not be construed to require an individual or entity to provide or pay for 
abortion-related services). 
 58. Bob Egelko, California Suit Hits Antiabortion Amendment, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2005, 
at B3. States are challenging the constitutionality of the Weldon Amendment on the grounds that 
―the vague and sweeping nature of the Clause has the potential to dramatically curb women‘s access 
to reproductive health care information and services.‖ Press Release, National Family Planning and 
Reproductive Health Association, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20041225081812/ 
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The Weldon Amendment provides that no federal agency or 
program, or state or local government, may receive any of the specified 
funds if ―[it] subjects any institutional or individual health care entity to 
discrimination on the basis that the health care entity does not provide, 
pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.‖59 Importantly, there 
are exceptions for rape, incest, and life-threatening pregnancies: 
governments that make healthcare providers perform abortions in these 
cases do not risk their federal funds.
60
 
The Weldon Amendment also broadened significantly the kind of 
entities that receive the conscience protection. Under the Weldon 
Amendment, a ―‗health care entity‘ includes an individual physician or 
other healthcare professional, a hospital, a provider-sponsored 
organization, a health maintenance organization, a health insurance plan, 
or any other kind of healthcare facility, organization, or plan.‖61 
 
C.  State Conscience Protections 
 
Before healthcare providers received explicit legislative 
accommodations, those who refused to perform controversial services 
did so at great risk to themselves. Thus, individual physicians and 
pharmacists have been disciplined, dismissed, sued, and retaliated 
against for not going along, either with employer demands or patient 
demands, with participating in abortions or other services.
62
 Like 
 
www.nfprha.org/media/index.asp?ID=32 (last accessed April 1, 2008). These challenges have been 
unsuccessful to date. See, e.g., Nat‘l Family Planning and Reprod. Health Ass‘n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 
391 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D.D.C. 2005) (refusing to enjoin the Weldon Amendment preliminarily on 
grounds that the Weldon Amendment was not unconstitutionally vague, did not violate the free 
speech rights of family planning services providers, and did not impermissibly delegate legislative 
power to an executive agency) vacated on other grounds and remanded by National Family Planning 
and Reproductive Health Ass‘n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826 (D.C.Cir. 2006). 
 59. Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(d)(1), 118 Stat. 2809, 3163; Pub. L. No. 109-149, 
§ 508(d)(1), 119 Stat. 2833, 2879–80. 
 60. Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(a) provides that: 
 
The limitations established in the preceding section shall not apply to an abortion—(1) if 
the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest; or (2) in the case where a woman 
suffers from a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life 
endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself, that 
would, as certified by a physician, place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion 
is performed. 
 
 61. Id. § 508(d)(2). 
 62. Firings and other disciplinary actions against pharmacists who refuse to provide 
emergency contraceptives have dominated the news in recent years. See, e.g., Rob Stein, For Some, 
There is No Choice, WASH. POST, July 16, 2006, at A06, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/15/AR2006071500790.html; Leah 
Thorsen, Druggists Suspended in Debate over Pill, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 2005, at A1 
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Congress, state legislatures also enacted conscience clauses after Roe to 
insulate providers from these harsh penalties.  This subsection explores 
the rich diversity of those approaches. 
 
1.  Boundaries of state conscience protections 
 
While nearly all states have enacted conscience clauses, states 
calibrate the interests of patients and providers in very different ways. 
Indeed, a quick review of state conscience clauses demonstrates the 
range of protection available to individuals and institutions. Three states, 
Alabama, New Hampshire, and Vermont, provide no protection for 
conscientious objectors. Others give providers an unfettered ability to opt 
out. Eighteen states allow any hospital or person not to participate in 
abortion procedures; eleven of these provide explicit statutory protection 
against liability to individual providers, facilities or both.
63
 
Other states limit the objector‘s ability to opt out. Some permit an 
objection only if the invoker ―shows proof‖ or states the reasons for 
objecting in writing.
64
 For example, California does not ―require a 
 
(reporting that Walgreens placed four Illinois pharmacists in the St. Louis area on unpaid leave for 
refusing to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception in violation of a rule imposed by Illinois 
Governor Rod Blagojevich in April of 2005 that requires Illinois pharmacies that sell contraceptives 
approved by the FDA to fill prescriptions for emergency birth control); Marilyn Gardner, 
Pharmacist’s Moral Beliefs vs. Women’s Legal Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 26, 2004, at 
11, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0426/p11s01-usju.html (reporting that a K-Mart 
pharmacist faced disciplinary hearings in Wisconsin after refusing to fill or transfer a woman‘s 
prescription for birth-control pills on the basis on the pharmacist‘s religious beliefs). 
  Some states explicitly protect the decision of a pharmacist or pharmacy to refuse to stock 
or dispense emergency contraceptives, following the traditional model of protecting a right of 
conscientious refusal. These include Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Dakota. See David 
A. Hyman & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Health Care Regulation: The Year in Review, The Searle 
Center Annual Review of Regulation, May 4, 2007, at 4, available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Hyman_Wilson_Annual_Rev_Final.pdf. 
However, ―more states have mandated the provision of emergency contraceptives, either by statute, 
executive order, or pharmacy board regulation.‖ Id. Over twenty states are still considering what 
action, if any, to take. Id. 
 63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-601(a) (2005); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-D54(f) 
(2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(8) (West 2002); HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-16(d) (LexisNexis 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-4 (LexisNexis 1993); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, §§ 1591, 1592 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20181 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 145.414 (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.032 (West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 
(LexisNexis 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e), (f) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2002); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (LexisNexis 2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (West 
2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34- 23A-11 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34- 23A-12 (1994); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-15-204 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-106 (2005). Of these, Arkansas, 
Delaware, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming give explicit statutory protection against liability to individuals, 
hospitals, or both. 
 64. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-104 (West 
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physician [or other healthcare provider] to directly participate in the 
induction or performance of an abortion if [that person] has filed a 
written statement with the employer or the hospital, facility, or clinic 
indicating a moral, ethical, or religious basis for refusal to participate in 
the abortion.‖65 
Some states only require conscientious objectors to provide notice to 
the patient beforehand.
66
 Pennsylvania is one such state, allowing 
objections to abortion or sterilization ―made freely available and 
conspicuously posted for public inspection.‖67 
Some conscience clauses simply mimic the protection afforded by 
the Church Amendment. Wisconsin requires no individual or entity to 
participate in or make its facilities available for abortion contrary to 
religious beliefs or moral convictions because of ―the receipt of any 
grant, contract, loan or loan guarantee under any state or federal law.‖68 
But many of these clauses also shield providers from punishment at the 
hands of the state and local government, as the Weldon Amendment 
does.
69
 For instance, in Montana, ―[the] refusal by any hospital or health 
care facility or person [to provide advice] shall not be grounds for loss of 
any privileges or immunities . . . or for the loss of any public benefits.‖70 
 
2.  Contests between individual providers and their employers 
 
Similar to the Church Amendment, many state conscience clauses 
address an individual‘s risk of coercion by her employer. Some even 
prohibit employers from asking prospective employees about refusals to 
participate. Any public or private employer in Illinois cannot ―orally 
question . . . any applicant . . . on account of the applicant‘s refusal to . . . 
participate in any way in any form of health care services contrary to his 
 
2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-612 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 510/13 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(4) (West 2005); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12I (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS 
LAW § 79-i (McKinney 1992); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955.2 (West 1991); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18.2-75 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (1996) (providing an exception for scheduled 
abortions only). 
 65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a) (West 1996). 
 66. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(c) (West 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-337 
(1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.475(1) (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485(2) (2003) (allowing 
physicians to refuse to give patients information about an abortion, but the physician must let the 
patient know about the refusal). 
 67. 16 PA. CODE §§ 51.31–51.32 (2005). 
 68. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.09(4) (West 2004). 
 69. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.33(C) (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, 
§ 12I (West 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(2) (West 2004). 
 70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005). 
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or her conscience‖ on an application form.71 
Other states recognize that individual refusal can place a burden on 
an employer. In these states, employees hired for the express purpose of 
performing a specific service are not exempted, nor are employees who 
work for facilities that exclusively provide abortions.
72
 In Kentucky if a 
healthcare facility is not ―operated exclusively for the purpose of 
performing abortions,‖ it may not discriminate against a person for 
refusing to participate in an abortion procedure.
73
 
Other states limit this encroachment on individual consciences to 
situations in which employers will experience an undue hardship as a 
result.
74
 For example, Missouri allows for lawful discrimination against a 
person who refuses to participate in an abortion if, in accommodating 
that refusal, it poses a hardship on the business or enterprise.
75
 
Importantly, these clauses sometimes accommodate matters of 
conscience in both directions. Take, for example, the ―renegade‖ 
physician who performs abortions outside a Catholic hospital but wants 
privileges within it. This physician may be concerned about being denied 
privileges at the Catholic hospital. California has solved this dilemma by 
providing that a person associated with a medical facility that does not 
permit abortion ―may not be subject to any penalty or discipline on 
account of the person‘s participation in the performance of an abortion‖ 
in another facility.
76
 
The right to refuse has been extended by some states to include 
grounds other than religion or morality. For example, Pennsylvania 
provides that no facility can be made to permit an abortion ―contrary to 
its stated ethical policy‖ and allows individuals the right to refuse on 
―professional grounds.‖77 Some states, such as Indiana, limit the ability 
to refuse only to denominational hospitals.
78
 Others have expanded the 
 
 71. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/7 (West 2002). 
 72. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/13 (West 2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213 
(West 2000). 
 73. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (5)(c) (West 2005). 
 74. See 16 PA. CODE § 51.51 (2000) (allowing a facility that provides abortions to seek a 
temporary exemption to the conscience clause protections). 
 75. MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.105 (West 2004). 
 76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 1996); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 333.20184 (West 2001); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.002 (b) (Vernon 2004). 
 77. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955.2 (West 1991). Compare id. with N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 
§ 79-i (McKinney 1992). 
 78. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-3 (LexisNexis 1993); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.2 
(West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (3) (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 65A-2 (West 
2000) (case law limits application of the statutory exemption to denominational hospitals); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 435.475(3) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40 (2002); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.004 
(Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.150 (West 
2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-105 (2005). 
  
475] A MATTER OF CONVICTION 491 
right to refuse even to insurers and other healthcare entities.
79
 Minnesota 
does not require any ―health plan company . . . or health care 
cooperative . . . to provide coverage for an abortion.‖80 
 
3.  The possibility of hardships for patients 
 
The ability to opt out raises the possibility of hardships for patients. 
This possibility has factored into how much insulation many states 
provide.
81
 Patently forcing people to act against their consciences when a 
hardship will not occur needlessly treads on their moral or religious 
beliefs with no countervailing gain. On the other hand, patients need 
access to services, especially in emergencies. Balancing both interests, 
some states limit the ability to refuse only to non-emergencies.
82
 Nevada 
does this, for example, by not requiring a ―hospital or other medical 
facility . . . which is not operated by the state or a local government or an 
agency of either . . . to permit the use of its facilities for the induction or 
performance of an abortion, except in a medical emergency.‖83 
A number of commentators—worried about access to needed 
services—go one step further and argue that an invoker should only be 
allowed to object when she does not pose a ―road block‖ to the patient‘s 
ability to access the desired service from another provider. They argue 
that providers should facilitate the patient‘s ability to get the service from 
another provider.
84
  At least one jurisdiction explicitly rejects such a 
duty, however. A licensed hospital in Maryland ―may not be required to 
 
 79. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(1) (West 2002). 
 80. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.414 (West 2005). 
 81. Critics of conscience clauses lament that in many rural and traditionally conservative 
areas, the next closest pharmacy or hospital is miles away and not easily accessible. Adam Sonfield, 
New Refusal Clauses Shatter Balance Between Provider “Conscience,” Patient Needs, THE 
GUTTMACHER REPORT, Aug. 2004, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/07/3 
/gr070301.pdf. 
  Recognizing that access issues are the dark underside of conscience clauses, some 
professional pharmacy groups believe we should do more to direct patients to willing providers. The 
American Pharmaceutical Association ―recognizes the individual pharmacist‘s right to exercise 
conscientious refusal and supports the establishment of systems to ensure patient access to legally 
prescribed therapy without compromising the pharmacist‘s right of conscientious refusal.‖ 
AMERICAN PHARMACISTS ASSOCIATION, 2004 HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT OF THE POLICY 
REVIEW COMMITTEE, available at http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search& 
section=About_APhA1&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=224. 
 82. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(1) (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-40, -50 
(2002); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.004 (Vernon 2004). 
 83. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.191 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 84. Commentators in the New England Journal of Medicine‘s Sounding Board have urged 
that the objecting pharmacist should be required to find a willing provider. Julie Kantor & Ken 
Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for 
Emergency Contraception?, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2008, 2008–12 (2004). 
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permit, within the hospital, the performance of any medical procedure 
that results in artificial insemination, sterilization, or termination of 
pregnancy; or to refer to any source for these medical procedures.‖85 
Significantly, protections for conscience need not come at the 
expense of access. In addition to hardship exceptions, information-
forcing rules—that is, rules that require refusing parties to direct patients 
to others who will perform the service—allow protection for matters of 
conscience without sacrificing access. States have capitalized on this 
approach with emergency contraceptives. For example, Illinois requires 
pharmacies that do not carry emergency contraceptives to post a sign 
directing patients to others that do.
86
 
In sum, states have structured legislative accommodations in 
different ways to provide greater or lesser protection for persons who 
object to performing a service. 
 
IV.  NAVIGATING MORAL CLASHES OVER SAME-SEX ADOPTION 
 
The parallels between the clashes over abortion and same-sex 
adoption are so striking that policymakers would be remiss not to draw 
on the abortion experience in deciding how to approach same-sex 
adoption.  What can policymakers distill from our nearly half century of 
experience with deeply divisive healthcare procedures? This Section 
offers four primary guideposts: first, legislatures need to prevent 
adoption agencies and professionals from exiting the market; second, 
legislatures need to step in to curb litigation; third, reasonable limitations 
should be placed on exemptions to avoid predictable hardships to same-
sex couples; and fourth, providing an exemption only if a hardship will 
not result best respects the interests of parties on both sides of this moral 
divide. 
 
A.  Preventing Exodus From the Market 
 
Faced with the inability to opt-out, agencies and professionals have 
already left the adoption market. It bears repeating that providers are not 
captives of the state and need not continue to provide services. When put 
to an all-or-nothing choice, many have chosen nothing. Conscience 
clauses offer states one way to avoid such high stakes. The uncertainty 
created by a failure to speak clearly here hurts not only providers but 
prospective adopters as well, both homosexual and heterosexual. As the 
 
 85. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (Lexis Nexis 2005). 
 86. See 68 Ill. Admin. Code 1330.91(k) (2006). 
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number of providers in the market shrinks, so too does the number of 
children that can reasonably be placed. 
Indeed, failing to act can only impose additional hardships on 
children awaiting adoption.  The exodus of Catholic Charities from 
Massachusetts‘ adoption market demonstrates this risk most poignantly. 
Catholic Charities placed more than 720 children for adoption over the 
span of two decades, many of them the hardest to place children.
87
 The 
agency‘s exit forced other agencies to absorb the placement of those 
children and may have lengthened the waiting time for children. The 
Boston Globe predicted that after Catholic Charities‘ departure, ―[f]oster 
children could face longer waits in an already backlogged system, and 
specialists say other agencies will have to scramble to pick up the 
Catholic Charities‘ caseload. Whether they can replace its network of 
seasoned, caring social workers is another question.‖88 One placement 
agency director called the outcome ―a shame because it is certainly going 
to mean that fewer children from foster care are going to find permanent 
homes.‖89 In this all-or-nothing gambit, Catholic Charities lost, 
prospective adoptive parents lost, and so did many children in 
Massachusetts.
90
 Driving providers from the market who may have been 
able to continue in their roles with a legislative exemption impoverishes 
the whole enterprise. 
Many will chafe at the idea that in a liberal democracy the state 
would accommodate religious or moral concerns over same-sex 
adoption, which is itself a deeply personal matter. Yet as Professor 
Minow observes, accommodating religious groups promotes certain 
liberal values.
91
 For example, without accommodation, we might see a 
strangling of religion by the state. Moreover, suppressing one set of 
religious ideas may be offensive to all Americans who view themselves 
as religious; this ―united front‖ needs to be considered when society 
decides whether and how much accommodation to give. 
92
 
As the next subsection explains, if legislatures fail to candidly 
resolve this moral clash through legislation, the boundaries of any right 
to refrain will necessarily be resolved—slowly and expensively—in suit 
after suit. 
 
 
 87. See Michael Levenson, Workers Rush to Fill Void Left by Boston Agency’s Decision, 
BOSTON  GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/03/ 
11/workers_rush_to_fill_void_left_by_boston_agencys_decision/. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Minow, supra note 16. 
 92. Id. 
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B.  Curbing Litigation 
 
Just as the recognition of abortion rights after Roe ushered in a wave 
of litigation, so will same-sex adoption if legislatures fail to decide ex 
ante whether there is a duty to assist, or, conversely, a right to refrain. 
Indeed, the Introduction to this essay suggests that we are now seeing the 
leading edge of litigation designed to resolve these competing claims.
93
 
Legislatures can deflect a torrent of litigation by deciding these 
questions now, as they ultimately did with fractious healthcare services. 
Indeed, conscience clauses figured prominently after Roe in turning back 
later waves of suits pressing the same arguments rejected by the Church 
Amendment.
94
 
 
C.  The Need for Reasonable Limitations on Exemptions 
 
One pivotal question states must address regarding same-sex 
adoption is whether a legislative exemption would erect a significant 
barrier to a same-sex couple‘s ability to adopt. This is especially 
important since many states have invited same-sex couples to parent, 
either through adoption or assisted conception. Here, our experience with 
emergency contraceptives shows that permitting conscientious refusals 
need not bar access to adoption. Instead, information-forcing rules could 
direct prospective parents to willing providers. 
In deciding whether to give conscience protections, states should 
consider a number of subsidiary questions:
95
 What impact would a 
legislative exemption have on same-sex couples seeking to adopt? 
Specifically, what percentage of the market of prospective adopters are 
 
 93. There is a long history of litigation between secularists and religious institutions when the 
later fulfills a traditional state role, as with education, adoption, and other social services. See 
generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002) (outlining a history of important litigation defining 
the boundaries of the First Amendment Separation Clause). 
 94. For instance, in Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, a married woman sued for a 
writ of mandamus and injunction against a private, nonprofit hospital that refused to do a tubal 
ligation for her. 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974). She alleged that the hospital acted under color of state 
law since it received Hill-Burton construction funds, enjoyed some state tax-exemption, and was 
generally under state regulation. Id. at 310. In affirming the district court‘s dismissal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that ―this argument has been seriously limited by 
[Congress‘s] action‖ in the Church Amendment, which ―was clearly intended by Congress to prevent 
suits such as that advanced by Appellant.‖ Id. 
 95. It is worth noting that Federal legislation introduced by Representative Barney Frank and 
others to end discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation includes a religious exemption.  See, 
e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007) (exempting 
―any of the employment practices of a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or 
society which has as its primary purpose religious ritual or worship or the teaching or spreading of 
religious doctrine or belief‖). 
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same-sex couples? What percentage of adoption agencies are likely to 
object to serving them? Will other adoption agencies fill their needs? 
Here it is worth noting anecdotally that some adoptions agencies 
explicitly advertise themselves as gay- and lesbian-friendly sites.
96
 
States should also explore what impact this approach would have on 
children awaiting adoption. States should assess, among other things, 
what would happen under an all-or-nothing regime. Specifically, if the 
state rejects conscience protections, will objecting agencies exit the 
market? If so, how many kids would they have placed and how many of 
these would be picked up by other agencies in the void left behind by 
their exit? Will the time frame for their placement lengthen as agencies 
depart the market? Do the exiting agencies serve the hardest-to-place 
children? 
In deciding how to proceed, legislatures should critically evaluate the 
variety of approaches taken with respect to healthcare services. Some 
legislative accommodations, like the Church Amendment, insulate 
providers from suits by patients and from coercion by employers or 
facilities. Some, like the Weldon Amendment, insulate providers from 
coercion by the government itself.  Conscience clauses can also exempt 
institutional providers and individual providers, but need not do both. 
Thus, a state could exempt individual workers but not agencies, or it 
could exempt only agencies, in which case it likely would not need to 
exempt individual workers. Professor Minow argues that states should be 
loath to hand out exemptions to both organizations and individuals. As 
she explains, ―each additional exemption curtails the application of the 
overarching norm—and civil rights laws as a result can be too easily and 
thoroughly undermined.‖97 As the next subsection explains, states should 
examine in particular the possibility that any conscience protection will 
create hardships for same-sex couples wishing to adopt. 
 
D.  The Prospect of Hardships 
 
States calibrate in very different ways the competing interests of 
providers and those seeking a service. Some endorse complete unfettered 
discretion to refuse; others carefully circumscribe the circumstances in 
which providers can refuse. Many states provide an exemption only 
when it poses no hardship to the individual requesting the service—in 
effect respecting religious and moral objections when no one would 
 
 96. See, e.g., Independent Adoption Center, http://www.adoptionhelp.org; A Child‘s Waiting, 
http://www.achildswaiting.com/adoptive_parents/adoption_questions/; Open Adoption, 
http://www.openadopt.org /index.php; Adopt a Special Kid, http://www.aask.org/. 
 97. Minow, supra note 16. 
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otherwise lose. For some, a ―hardship‖ rule for exemptions presents a 
lose-lose scenario: objectors will still be offended by facilitating same-
sex adoptions in cases of hardship, and same-sex couples will find cold 
comfort in the fact that they receive equal access, but only when a 
hardship would otherwise result. It may be, however, the best we can 
hope for in a pluralistic society that prizes both religious liberty and the 
desire to parent. 
States considering a hardship approach with respect to same-sex 
adoption should ask a number of questions: (1) How many different 
agencies in the state can facilitate an adoption, and how many would 
exercise an exemption? (2) Do adoption agencies now segment the 
market, helping some prospective adopters but not others (for example, a 
Muslim adoption agency placing Muslim children with Muslim 
families)? (3) How likely is it that every adoption agency in a given area 
will assert a moral objection?
98
 In such instances, these foreseeable 
denials would clearly pose a hardship for the couple. 
(4) Will the ability to opt out bar access by same-sex couples to 
adoption altogether? Here, states should consider the role of Internet 
adoption sites. They should also consider the ease or difficulty of 
adopting across state lines, which some states discourage. States should 
also consider whether prospective adopters will lose the ability to adopt 
infants or other children they would see as desirable, including children 
to whom they may have developed an emotional attachment. To the 
extent that the couple cannot easily adopt outside their home state, and 
no one will serve them within the state, allowing for conscientious 
objections without addressing hardships is tantamount to prohibiting a 
couple from adopting. 
(5) Will same-sex couples experience hardships other than a lack of 
access? It seems possible that hardships may result in particular cases as 
well as systemically. Consider an agency that begins to serve an 
individual whom they later learn is in a same-sex relationship, and only 
then does the agency balk. Or consider an individual caseworker who 
asks to be exempted from assisting a same-sex couple but drags her feet 
or otherwise acts as a roadblock when other caseworkers would gladly 
serve the clients‘ needs. Here, states may want to tie an exemption to a 
duty to transfer the case and step aside. A transfer may be the only 
equitable solution when the couple has sunk a lot of time and money into 
 
 98. Despite the possibility of hardship, locales in which every agency or nearly every agency 
will claim a moral objection should not occur very often. A number of adoption agencies now offer 
services to same-sex couples and advertise themselves explicitly as gay and lesbian friendly sites. 
See, e.g., Independent Adoption Center, http://www.adoptionhelp.org; A Child‘s Waiting, 
http://www.achildswaiting.com/adoptive_parents/adoption_questions/; Open Adoption, 
http://www.openadopt.org/index.php; Adopt a Special Kid, http://www.aask.org/. 
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an adoption in the form of agency fees or the cost of a home study—not 
to mention their emotional investment. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The question posed by moral clashes over same-sex adoption is not 
whether same-sex couples should parent—clearly same-sex couples are 
now parenting—but whether private adoption agencies may help some 
but not all prospective parents. Deciding when, if ever, it is acceptable 
for providers to refrain from facilitating an adoption will stave off a wave 
of litigation and years of uncertainty. For this reason alone, new 
legislation resolving the question is warranted. But addressing this matter 
of conviction forthrightly serves another end as well: ensuring that 
providers of adoption placement and other services continue in their 
important roles. Left with all-or-nothing choices, many providers have 
chosen nothing. 
Far from offering only black-and-white, all-or-nothing outcomes, 
conscience clauses permit states to accommodate both the interests of 
those who want a service and those who have moral objections to 
providing it. With information-forcing rules and hardship provisions, 
states can preserve the dignitary and parenting interests of same-sex 
couples without reflexively dismissing the religious or moral objections 
of providers. 
